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Abstract. 
When computing the reliability of a system consisting of several components, it is usually 
assumed that the components are statistically independent of each other. In case the components 
are associated, it is known that this leads to underestimation if the system is series, whereas the 
converse holds for parallel systems. In this paper we consider general monotone systems and 
study the error resulting from the independence assumption when the component states are in 
fact distributed according to certain dependence models. We also consider some applications of 
the results to network systems. 
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1. Introduction. 
The assumption of statistical independence is usual in reliability theory as it is in other parts of 
statistics and probability. The difficulties arising when the dependence cannot be ignored, are 
related both to the lack of information concerning the dependence structure as well as the possible 
increase in computational complexity. Recently, however, Hagstrom and Mak (1986) have 
shown that computing system reliability in the presence of correlated failures is not significantly 
harder than writing down the joint probability distribution and computing the system reliability 
when the components fail independently. Hence, it seems that developing satisfactory 
dependence models is the most important task. 
In reliability theory dependence is frequently modelled in terms of associated random variables. 
(See Barlow and Proschan (1981).) Using this it is possible to develop bounds on the system 
reliabilty valid for a fairly large class of joint distributions for the component states. However, 
since these bounds are, in the worst cases, very crued, it is often preferred to work out the 
socalled excact expressions under the independence assumption, neglecting that this may be 
terribly unrealistic. 
In the case of association it is known that this leads to underestimation of the system reliability if 
the system is series, whereas the converse holds for parallel systems. For more general types of 
systems no such results exists. 
In the present report we consider two parametric dependence models. We shall refer to these 
models as the shock model and the stand-by model, respectively. The shock model is identical to 
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the one considered in Boyles and Samaniego (1984) and Huseby (1986). In a sense these models 
can be viewed as dual to each other. However, in both cases one gets variables being associated. 
Under the above models it is possible to provide some further characterizations of the occurence 
of over- and underestimation. These characterizations depend not only on the structure of the 
system under consideration, but also on certain parameters of the joint distribution. The report 
generalizes parts of Egeland (1985). 
2. Basic notation and results. 
In this section we review some basic results of reliability theory needed in this study. We start by 
introducing the notion of binary monotone system. 
A binary monotone system (BMS) is an ordered pair (E,<j>), where E = { 1, ... ,n} is a non-empty 
set of components, and <!>=<!>(X) is a binary (0-1) non-decreasing function of the component state 
vector X. The function <1> is called the structure function of the system, and describes the state of 
the system; i.e. <1>=1 if the system is functioning and <j>=O if the system is failed. Similarly, the 
i-th entry of the component state vector, Xi, is respectively 1 or 0 if the i-th component is 
functioning or failed, i=1, ... ,n. 
It is well-known that <1> is a socalled multilinear function of X. That is, for some suitable function 
8, <1> may be expressed as: 
(2.1.) <!>(X) = L 8(A) IT xi 
A~ iEA 
The function 8 is called the signed domination function of the system. The concept of 
domination was introduced in Satyanarayana and Prabhakar (1978). Huseby (1984) and Huseby 
(1985) provides a further study of this. Other recent papers on this subject are Barlow and Iyer 
(1985) and Hagstrom (1986). 
We say that a BMS, (E,<j>), is trivial if <1> is constant w.r.t. X. Otherwise, it is called non-trivial. 
If A is a subset of E, then xA denotes the subvector of X corresponding to the set A. If A1, 
A2, ... are disjoint subsets of E, we shall use the notation (xAl,XA2, ... ,x) denoting the vector X 
where the subvectors corresponding to the sets A1, A2, ... have the values xA1, xA2, ... 
respectively. The rest of the vector (i.e. entries corresponding to the set E\(A1uA2u .... ·)) has the 
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value x. Thus f.ex. X= (lA1,0A2,X) means that the entries of X corresponding to the sets A1 
and A2 have the values 1 and 0 respectively, while the rest of the vector is just specified to be x. 
By conditioning on some of the component state variables, say those corresponding to the set 
AcE, one obtains a socalled minor system of the original system. F.ex. given that xA = 
(1A 1,0A2) where A 1uA 2=A and A 1nA2=0, one obtains a minor system denoted by 
(E\A,q,+A1-A) (or alternatively (E\A,q,_A2+A1)) where the structure function <P+A1-A2 is defined 
on XE.\A and given by: 
At A2 
(2.2.) <P +A -A ( · ) = <P(l , 0 , · ) 
1 2 
If either A1 or A2 is empty, we simply write <P-A or <P+A respectively. 
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A set AcE is a cut set if <P- A (XE\A) = 0 for all XE~. Similarly, a set AcE is a path set if 
<P+ A (XE.\A) = 1 for all XE\A. 
Of special relevance to this paper are the number of cut sets and the number of path sets of 
cardinality 1. For a BMS (E,q,) these are denoted by c(<P) and s(<P) respectively. If the system is 
trivial, we define c(<P) = s(<P) = 0. The following are some easily established properties of c(<P) 
and s(q,). 
(2.4.) If (E\A,q,_ A) is non-trivial, then c(<P)>O => c(q,_ A)>O. 
If (E\A,q,+ A) is non-trivial, then s( <P )>0 => s( <P+ A)>O. 
The reliability function of a BMS (E,q,) is denoted by h and is defmed by: 
(2.5.) h = h(p) = L o(A) IT Pi 
A!;;E ieA 
where o is the signed domination function of the system and p = (p1, ..... ,pn) is the vector of 
component reliabilities, (i.e. pi= P(Xi=1), i=1, ... ,n). When p1=····=pn=p, we simply write h = 
h(p). (Observe that h(p) is a polynomial in p of degree nor less.) If (E,q,) is non-trivial, then 
h(O)=O and h(l)=l. Furthermore, if the component state variables are independent, then h = 
Pr( <P= 1) = The reliability of the system. 
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We close this section by listing some well-known, useful properties of the reliability function: 
(2.6.) h'(p)lp=l = c(<j>). 
(2.7.) s(<j>) > 0 h(p) ~ p for all pe [0,1]. 
(2.8.) c(<j>)>O h(p) ~ p for all pe [0,1]. 
If p = (p1,. ... ,pn) and q = (q1, .... ,qn), then (p q) and (piiq) denote the vectors (p1q 1, .. 
.. ,pnqn) and (p1IIql' .... ,pniiqn) respectively. (II denotes the socalled "ip-operator" and is 
defined by (z1II···II ~) = 1- (1-z1) ·:· (1-zn).) Ifp and q are vectors of probabilities, then: 
(2.9.) h(p q) ~ h(p) h(q) 
(2.10.) h(p II q) ~ h(p) II h( q) 
For more details and proofs we refer to Barlow and Proschan (1981). 
3. The dependence models. 
We start by presenting the shock model. This model was suggested by Boyles and Samaniego 
(1984) and can be viewed as a discrete analog to the well-known multivariate exponential distri-
bution introduced by Marshall and Olkin (1967). It appears to be particulary useful in order to 
model socalled common cause failures. However, as shown in Huseby (1986), it may also 
serve as a tool for deriving fast algorithms for reliability calculations. 
The model is based on the assumption that the failures of the components are caused by different 
types of "shocks" striking single components or groups of components. More precisely, we 
assume that for each non-empty subset A of the component set E, there exists a possible shock 
which, if it occurs, kills all the components in the set A and these alone. In order to describe the 
"shock status", for each non-empty AcE, we introduce a random variable Y A being 1 if the 
shock striking the set A has not occurred and 0 otherwise. 
The component state variables, i.e. the Xes, may now be expressed in terms of theY A-s as 
follows: 
<3.1.) xi = IT Y A i = 1, .... ,n. 
A:ieA 
We assume that the Y A-s are independent and that P(Y A =1) = 8 A , 0cAcE. Hence, the 
component reliabilities are given by: 
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(3.2.) i = 1, .... ,n. 
The shocks striking single components, will be called individual shocks, while the others will 
be called external shocks. 
If some of thee A-s are equal to 1, then clearly the corresponding Y A-s may be left out in (3.1.). 
Thus, restricted models, i.e. models where only some of the shocks are present, may be derived 
as special cases of the general model. Especially, if e A =1 for all A with cardinality greater than 
1, i.e. only individual shocks are present, then the Xrs are independent. 
We now turn to the stand-by model. This model is based on the assumption that the functioning 
of the components are ensured by different types of "stand-by components". Specifically, we 
assume that for each non-empty subset A of the component set E, there exists a stand-by 
component which if it functions, ensures that the set A, and this alone, functions. As for the 
shock model, we introduce status variables ZA being 1 if the stand-by corresponding to the set A 
is functioning and 0 otherwise. 
The Xrs is expressed in terms of the Z A-s as follows: 
(3.3.) X.=Il 1 i = 1, .... ,n. A:iEA 
Assuming that the ZA-s are independent and that P(ZA=1) = JlA, 0cAcE, implies that the 
component reliabilities in this case are given by: 
(3.4.) pi = II JlA i = 1, .... ,n. 
A:iEA 
We say that a stand-by is individual if it affects a single component only. Otherwise, it is called 
external. 
If some of the JlA-s are equal to 0, then the corresponding ZA-s may be left out in (3.3.). Thus 
again, restricted models, i.e. models where only some of the stand-by components are present, 
may be derived as special cases of the general model. Especially, if Jl A =0 for all A with 
cardinality greater than 1, i.e. only individual stand-by components are present, then the Xrs are 
independent. 
We observe that in both models the Xrs are represented as increasing functions of independent 
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variables. Hence, by standard results on associated random variables (see Barlow and Proschan 
(1981)), it follows that the Xes are associated. 
4. Main results. 
We shall now develop the main results of this report. Since the proofs typically are similar for 
the two models, we shall spend most of the time on the results concerning the shock model. The 
corresponding results for the stand-by model will be treated more briefly. 
In the study of the shock model we have focused on cases where the external shock probabilities 
are low. Although many of the results either have obvious counterparts concerning external 
shocks with high probability, or directly apply to these cases, we consider such results far less 
important. Our main goal is to perform a sensitivity study. Thus, we concentrate on cases where 
the component state variables are not too strongly dependent. If the external shock probabilities 
are high, we have a more extreme type of dependence, and thus a sensitivity study is of limited 
value. In such cases the dependence has to be modelled explicitly, f.ex. by application of some 
plausible parametric model. Besides, it is a fact that in most practical applications the 
components are highly reliable, i.e. all the shock probabilities are low. 
Of similar reasons in the study of the stand-by model we focus on cases where the external 
stand-by components have high failure probabilities. 
Assume that (E,<j>) is a BMS with reliability function h, and let E={ 1, .... ,n}. As a start, we 
consider the simplest case where all the shocks except one are internal. Let BeE be the set 
correspobding to the external shock. We assume that e A= e if A=B, and that e A =1ti if A={i}, 
iEE. Hence, the vector of component reliabilities is given by: 
(4.1.) p = (SnB,n) 
If we ignore the dependence between the components (caused by the external shock), we would 
assess the system reliability to be: 
(4.2.) 
The correct assessment is easily obtained by conditioning on the status variable of the external 
shock, and is given by: 
(4.3.) R2 = 8 h(n) + (1-8) h(OG, 11) 
where G=E\F, and F is the union of minimal path sets which are not affected by the external 
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shock. 
Our main concern now is to study the sign of the difference e(S, n)= R1-R2 as 8 and 'Jf vary. 
We denote this difference by e(S, n). Clearly, the reliability is overestimated if e(S,n)>O, and 
underestimated if e(S,n)<O. 
The first and easiest result concerns the case where B is a cut set. Note that in this case 
h(OG,n)=O. Hence,~ simply equals Sh(n). 
Theorem 4.1. Consider the BMS (E,<j>) described above. Assume especially that B, the set 
corresponding to the external shock, is a cut set. 
(4.4.) h(S nB,n) ::; e h(n) , i.e. e(S,n)::; 0. 
If c(<j>+(E\B)) = 0, then there exists an e>O (e::;1) such that for all 8, 1tl' ... ,1tne [1-e,1] we have: 
(4.5.) h(S nB,n);::: 8 h(n) , i.e. e(S,n);::: 0. 
Proof: Assume first that c(<j>+(E\B)) > 0. Then by (2.9.) we get: 
(4.6.) h(S nB,n) ::; h(81B,1) h(n) 
Now, clearly h(81B,1) is the reliability function of <j>+(E\B)' evaluated at (81B). Hence, by 
(2.8.) and the assumption it follows that: 
(4.7.) h(81 B ,1) ::; 8 , for all Se [0,1]. 
By combining (4.6.) and (4.7.) the inequality (4.4.) follows. 
Assume then that c( <1> +(E\B)) = 0, and consider the e~or fun~tion e when 'Jf = 1. We may assume 
that (E,<j>) is non-trivial since (4.5.) is obvious in the trivial case. Hence, especially h(1) = 1 and 
we get: 
(4.8.) e(8,1) = h(81B,1) - 8 
As already mentioned, the first term of (4.8.) is the reliability function of <I>+(E\B)' evaluated at 
(81B). Hence, by (2.6.) we get that: 
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(4.9.) i_e(8,1)1 =c(cj> )-1=-1. 
ae e=1 +(E\B) 
Since, (d/d8) e(8, 1Y) obviously is a continous function w.r.t. 8 and 1T (being a polynomial in 8 
and 1T), it follows that for some €>0 (€~1) we have for all 8, 1t1, ... ,1tnE [1-€,1] that: 
a (4.10.) - e(8,n) ~-B. 
ae 
where B>O is a suitable number. 
By Taylor's formula and the obvious fact that e(l, 1T )=0, we then get that for all 8, 
n 1, ... ,1tne [1-€,1] we have: 
(4.11.) e(8,n) = e(1,n) + i_ e(60,n) (8- 1) ~ 0 + B(l- 8) > 0 ae 
where 80e [8,1] is suitably chosen. Thus, (4.5.) is proved. 0 
Using Theorem 4.1. as a tool we can now extend the result to the case where the external shock 
is not fatal to the system, i.e. B is not a cut set. 
Theorem 4.2. Consider the BMS (E,cj>) described above. Assume now that B, the set 
corresponding to the external shock, is not a cut set. Moreover, let F be the union of the minimal 
path sets which are not affected by the shock, i.e. those minimal path sets P such that P(JB=0 
and letG=(E\F). Finally, let e be the family of sets CcF such that (B,[cj>+(G\B)]+C-(F\C)) is 
non-trivial. 
If c( [cj>+(G\B)]+C-(F\C)) > 0 for all Ce e then for all 8, 1t1, .... ,1tnE [0,1] we have: 
( 4.12.) h(81TB, 1Y) ~ 8 h( 1Y) + (1-8) h(OG, 1T) , i.e. e(8, 1Y) ~ 0. 
If c( [cj>+(G\B)]+C-(F\C)) = 0 for all Ce e then there exists an E>O (€~1) such that for all 8, 
n 1, .... ,1tne [1-€,1] we have: 
(4.13.) h(81TB,1T) ~ 8 h(1Y) + (1-8) h(OG,1T) , i.e. e(8,1T) ~ 0. 
Proof: We introduce the notation: 
(4.14.) P(C) = [fl 1ti] [fl (1- 1ti)] 
ieC ief\C 
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Assume first that c( [<I>+(G\B)]+C-(F\C)) > 0 for all Ce e. By conditioning on the state variables of 
the components in F, we get: 
B """' C F\C B (4.15.) h(8n ,n) = ~ h(l ,0 ,en ,n) P(C) 
Cg 
[by observing that h(lc,oFC, enB,Tf) = h(lc,oFC,n) for all Ce e since these sets correspond 
to trivial systems, i.e. the reliabilities of the components in G does not affect the system 
reliability.] 
"""' C F\C """' C f\C ~ 8 ~ h(l , 0 , n) P(C) + ~ h(l ,0 , n) P(C) 
cee 
[by Theorem 4.1. and the assumption since the external shock obviously is fatal to the system 
(G, [<I>+(G\B)]+C-(F\C)) for all Ce e.] 
[by observing that h(lC,of\C, 'TT) = h(lC,oF\C, 0) for all Ce e, and that h(lC,of\C, 0) = 0 
forCe e.] 
= 8 h(n) + (1-8) h(OG,n). 
Hence (4.12.) is proved. 
The proof of (4.13.) follows by noting that by Theorem 4.1. the inequality in (4.15.) is 
reversed when c([<I>+(G\B)]+C-(F\C))=O for all Ce e. 0 
Although the above theorems are developed in the context of shock models, they may be viewed 
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more generally as results on reliability functions. By applying this general interpret~t~n, the 
theorems may be used to handle cases where more than one external shock is pre~ent. We 
illustrate this by an example. . .. I . 
! ) I I 
: I 
Example 4.3. Consider the network system (E,<j>) illustrated in Figure 4.1. whi~q functi~ns if 
I I : 
node s and node t can communicate through the network. The components of the system are 
denoted by 1, 2, ... , 6, and the corresponding internal shock probabilities are (l-1t~)~(1-~2), 
... , (1-1t6), respectively. We assume that the system is affected by two externa1 shocks, with 




s 3 t 6 
4 
Figure 4.1. Graph of a network system. 
(4.16.) 
It is easy to see that ignoring the dependence caused by the two external shocks implies that the 
system reliability is assessed to be: 
The correct value is obtained by conditioning on the status variables of the two external shocks, 
and observing that the shock corresponding to the set B2 is fatal to the system, and is given by: 
Since B2 is a cut set, and c(<j>+(E\B2))=0 we may apply Theorem 4.1. to h(p2) and get: 
provided that 82, p11 , ... ,p16e [1-e1'1] for some suitable e1>0 (E1$1). Furthermore, B1 is not a 
cut set. Hence, we can apply Theorem 4.2. to h(p1). Let F denote the union of minimal path 
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sets, P, such that PnB 1=0, i.e. F={4,5,6}, le~ G=(E\F), i.e. G=B 1, and let e denote the 
I ' 
family of sets CcF such that (B 1 , [<j>+(G\B1)]+C-(F\C)) is non-trivial. It is easy to see that the 
only set in e is C={5,6}. Hence, since c([<j>+(G\B1)]+C-(F'C))=0, we get: 
By combining (4.19.) and (4.20.) we get that R1 ~ R2 whenever 81, 82, 1t1, .... ,1t6 e [1-E,1] 
where E>O (e::s;1) is some suitable number. That is, in this case the reliability is overestimated if 
the dependence is ignored. 
In the above calculations we treated the external shocks in two steps. The first step concerned 
the shock striking B2, while the second concerned the one striking B1• It is important to notice 
that these steps cannot be interchanged. If we start out by treating the shock striking B 1, then it 
turns out to be impossible to obtain any useful inequalities in the second step. In order to take a 
closer look at this, we introduce q1 = (q11, ..... ,q16) and q2 = (q2l' ..... ,q26) given by: 
We obviously have that p2 = q2. Hence, especially R1 = h(q2). 
Since B1 is not a cut set, we may apply Theorem 4.2. to h(q2) and get: 
In order to proceed we may now try to apply Theorem 4.1. to h(q1) and h(OB1,q1). It is easily 
established that h(q1) ~ 82 h(1f) for 8, 1tl" .. ,1t6 sufficiently close to 1. However, h(OB1,q1) is 
equal to the reliability function of (E\Bp<j>_B1), evaluated at q 1E\B1, [See (2.2.)] and c(<j>_B1)=1. 
Hence, we get that h(OB1,q1) :::;; 82 h(OB1, 1f). Thus, no conclusion is obtainable in this case. 0 
As shown in the above example, it is possible to extend the results given in Theorem 4.1. and 
Theorem 4.2. considerably. However, especially if many of the external shocks are non-fatal to 
the system, the conditions for under- and overestimation soon become very involved. In some 
cases, nice characterizations can be obtained. In the following two theorems we consider a BMS 
(E,<j>) where A is the family of sets corresponding to the external shocks. In particular, we 
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assume that for each set, Ae A, the corresponding external shock occurs with probability 
(1-8 A). Let 8 be the vector of 8 A-s, (in some arbitrary order). As before the internal shocks 
occur with probabilities 1tl' ..... ,1tn' respectively. Finally, we define the error function: 
( 4.23.) e(B, Tf) =(The reliability assessed assuming independence) - (Correct value.) 
Theorem 4.4. Consider the BMS (E,<j>) described above. Assume especially that each Ae A is 
fatal to the system. 
If c(<!>+(E\A)) > 0 for each Ae A, then for all 8 A (Ae A), 1tl' .... ,1tne [0,1], we have that e(B,Tf) 
~ 0, i.e. the reliability is underestimated. 
If c(<!>+(E\A)) = 0 for each Ae A, then there exists an £>0 (£~1) such that for all e A (Ae A), 
1t1, .... ,1tne [1-£,1] we have that e(B,Tf) ~ 0, i.e. the reliability is overestimated. 
Proof: The result follows directly by applying Theorem 4.1. as in Example 4.3. 
Observe that if c(<!>)=O, then by (2.3.) c(<!>+(E\A))==O for all AcE. Hence, the condition for 
overestimation is often very easy to verify. 
Theorem 4.5. Consider the BMS (E,<)>) described above. Assume especially that each Ae A is 
non-fatal to the system. Moreover, for each Ae A, let FA be the union of minimal path sets 
which are not affected by the shock, i.e. those minimal path sets P such that PrA=0 and let 
G A=(E\F A). Finally, let C A be the family of sets CcF A such that (A, [ <1> +(G A \A)]+C-(F A \C)) is 
non-trivial. 
If c( [<!>+(GA\A)]+C-(FA\C)) > 0 for all CecA and Ae A, then for all eA (Ae A), 1t1, ... ,1tn E 
[0,1], we have that e(B, Tf) ~ 0, i.e. the reliability is underestimated. 
Proof: The theorem follows by applying Theorem 4.2. as in Example 4.3. and noting that by 
(2.4.) c( [<!>+(GA\A)]+C-(FA\C)) > 0 for all CeCA implies that c( [ [<!>+(GA\A)]+C-(FA\C) ]_B)> 0 
for all CcF A and BcA, such that (A\B, [ [<!>+(GA\A)]+C-(F ... \C) ]_B) is non-trivial. 0 
It is possible to formulate a sufficient condition for overestimation of the reliability in the case of 
shocks which are non-fatal to the system. However, as one may suspect, this is rather compli-
cated and thus not very useful in practical situations. This topic is discussed further in Section 6. 
We observe that in all the above theorems the sign of the error depends both on the "cut 
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structure" of the system and the different shock probabilities. In a given practical situation it is 
(at least in principle) possible to verify the cut structure condition simply by examining the 
structure of the system. Information concerning the shock probabilities, however, may be far 
more difficult to get. Still it is possible to get around this problem if the sets corresponding to the 
external shocks as well as the marginal component reliabilities are known. This is done as 
follows: 
By examining the sets corresponding to the external shocks and the cut structure of the system, 
one determines if the given system satisfies the cut structure condition of any of the above 
theorems. If the cut structure indicates that the reliability is underestimated, i.e. the relevant 
minors contain cut sets of cardinality one, then clearly the shock probabilities need not be 
considered. That is, the reliability is underestimated for all possible shock probabilities. 
However, if the cut structure indicates overestimation, i.e. none of the relevant minors have cut 
sets of cardinality one, then we must examine t~e 8 A-s and 1tcs more carefully. More 
specifically, we must determine whether we have: 
(4.24.) e A E [1-e,l] for all Ae .A., and 1tiE [1-e,l] for all ie E. 
where e>O (e~l) is determined from the structure. 
Let Pi denote the marginal reliability of the i-th component, and .A.i denote the family of sets 
Ae .A. such that ie A, i=l, .... ,n. Then we have: 
(4.25.) pi = 1ti (rr 8 A ) , i=l, ... ,n. 
AEA. 
1 
Now, a sufficient condition for (4.24.) to be true may be expressed in terms of the pi-s simply 
as: 
(4.26.) pie [1-e,l] , i=l, .... ,n. 
Thus, we see that it is not necessary to know the excact values of the shock probabilities in order 
to obtain a conclusion. This simple observation extends the usefulness of the above results 
considerably. 
In the last theorem on the shock model we show that if there are many non-fatal shocks, then 
even the cut structure condition for overestimation given in Theorem 4.5. is rarely satisfied. 
Similarly, if there are many fatal shocks (i.e. fatal to the system), then the cut structure condition 
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for underestimation given in Theorem 4.4. is rarely satisfied. 
Theorem 4.6. Consider the BMS (E,<j>) described above, and let Jt be the family of sets 
corresponding to the external shocks. Furthermore, let :P be the family of path sets of cardinality 
greater than one which are not cut sets, and Q be the family of minimal cut sets. For simplicity 
we assume that every component in E is contained in at least one minimal cut set. 
If QcJt, then the cut structure condition for underestimation given in Theorem 4.4. is satisfied 
if and only if the system is a series system of all the components, that is <j>(X) = X1 X2 ···· ~· 
If :PcJt, and :P is non-empty, then the cut structure condition for overestimation given in 
Theorem 4.5. is satisfied if and only if the system is a parallel system of all the components, that 
is <j>(X) = X 1 II X 2 II ····II Xn. 
Proof: It is very easy to see that the "if"-parts of the theorem are true. [Indeed since the 
variables in our models always are associated, it follows by standard results (see Barlow and 
Proschan (1981)) that the reliability is underestimated if the system is series and overestimated 
if the system is parallel. Thus, Theorem 4.4. and Theorem 4.5. are not needed to characterize 
the error function in this case.] 
Assume first that QcJt, and that the cut structure condition for underestimation given in 
Theorem 4.4. is satisfied. Hence, especially c(<j>+(E\A)) > 0 for each Ae Q. However, if Ae Q, 
then (A,<j> +(E\A)) is a parallel system. Thus, c( <1> +(E\A)) > 0 implies that the set A has cardinality 
one. Since this is true for all Ae Q, and since we have assumed that every component is 
contained in at least one minimal cut set, it follows that (E,<j>) is a series system of all the 
components, i.e. <j>(X) = X 1 X 2 ···· Xn. 
Assume then that :PcJt, :P is non-empty, and that the cut structure condition for overestimation 
given in Theorem 4.5. is satisfied. Now, for each Ae :P let GA and FA be defined as in 
Theorem 4.5. If Ae :P, then by definition A is a path set and FA contains the union of all 
minimal path sets, P, such that PnA=0. Hence, (G A \A) cannot be a path set, and thus 
(A, [<j>+(GA\A)l-F) is non-trivial. Especially, it follows by the assumption that c([<j>+(GA\A)LF) 
= 0, implying that (A, [<j>+(GA\A)LF) cannot be a series system. Thus, A cannot be a minimal 
path set. Since this is true for all Ae :P, it follows that all the minimal path sets of the system 
either are of cardinality one or are cut sets. Assume now that there exists a minimal path set P 0 
of cardinality greater than one, i.e. P 0 is a cut set. Then it is easy to see that PnP 0;t0 for all 
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minimal path sets P (See Huseby (1984) p.ll). Hence, since P0 is minimal, this implies that 
every minimal path set has cardinality greater than one, and thus is a cut set. However, this 
implies that every path set (minimal or not) is also a cut set, contradicting that the family :Pis 
non-empty. Hence, we conclude that every minimal path set is of cardinality one. Since we have 
assumed that every component is contained in at least one minimal cut set, we get that (E,cj>) is a 
parallel system of all the components, i.e. <j>(X) = X1 u X2 u ····· u Xn. D 
We close this section by briefly presenting the corresponding results on the stand-by model. 
Since the proofs are completely analogous, we skip them here. Note, however, the duality 
between the results on the two models. While the conditions in the theorems on the shock model 
were formulated in terms of the cut structure, the corresponding results on the stand-by model 
are formulated in terms of the path structure. 
We now consider a BMS (E,cj>) where A is the family of sets corresponding to external stand-by 
components. In particular, we assume that for each set Ae A, the corresponding external 
stand-by is functioning with probability ~A' Let J1 be the vector of the ~A-s (in some arbitrary 
order), and let 1f = ( 1t1 , .... ,1tn) be the vector of internal stand-by reliabilities. 
If A contains only one set, the reliability assessed when assuming independence is given by: 
where~ is the reliability of the external stand-by. The correct value is: 
(4.28.) R2 = J.1 h(lG,n) + (1-J.L) h(n) . 
where G=E\F, and F is the union of minimal cut sets C such that CnA=0. By using (2.6.), 
(2.7.), (2.10.) and Taylor's formula, a result analogous to Theorem 4.1. may be developed. 
More generally, we define the error function: 
(4.29.) e(Jl, n) =(The reliability assessed assuming independence)- (Correct value). 
Theorem 4.7. Consider the BMS (E,cj>) described above. Assume especially that each Ae A is 
a path set of the system. 
If s( cj> -(E.\A) > 0 for each Ae A, then for all J.1 A (Ae A), 1t1 , .... ,1tn e [0, 1] we have that e(Jl, 1Y) 
~ 0, i.e. the reliability is overestimated. 
If s(cj>_(E\A)) = 0 for each Ae A, then there exists an E>O (ES1) such that for all JlA (Ae .A.), 
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1t1, .... ,1tn e [O,E] we have that e(JI, 11) s 0, i.e. the reliability is underestimated. 0 
Note that if s(<j>)=O, then by (2.3.) s(<j>_(E\A)) = 0 for each AcE. Hence, the condition for 
underestimation is often very easy to verify. 
Theorem 4.8. Consider the BMS (E,<j>) described above. Assume especially that Ae A is not a 
path set of the system. Moreover, for each Ae Jt, let FA be the union of minimal cut sets which 
are not affected by the stand-by, i.e. those minimal cut sets C such that CnA=0, and let 
GA=(E\FA). Finally, let ~A be the family of sets C~FA such that (A, [<j>_(GA\A)]+C-(FA\C)) is. 
non-trivial. 
If s([<I>_(GA\A)]+C-(FA\C)) > 0 for all Ce ~A' then for all !J.A (Ae A), 1tl' ..... ,1tn e [0,1], we have 
that e(JI, 11) ~ 0, i.e. the reliability is overestimated. 0 
Also in this case it is possible to formulate a sufficient condition for underestimation of the 
reliability in the case of stand-by components corresponding to non-path sets. However, as in 
the shock model case, the condition is too complicated to be of practical use. 
In both the above theorems the sign of the error depends on the "path structure" of the system 
and the different stand-by reliabilities. However, by using an argument similar to the one we 
used in the case of the shock model, it can be seen that it is sufficient to know the marginal 
reliabilities of the components instead of the excact stand-by reliabilities. 
Finally, we present the result on the stand-by model corresponding to Theorem 4.6. 
Theorem 4.9. Consider the BMS (E,<j>) described above, and let A be the family of sets 
corresponding to the external stand-by components. Furthermore, let Q be the family of cut sets 
of cardinality greater than one which are not path sets, and let J> be the family of minimal path 
sets. 
For simplicity we assume that every component in E is contained in at least one minimal path 
set. 
If :PeA, then the path structure condition for overestimation given in Theorem 4.7. is satisfied 
if and only if the system is a parallel system of all the components, i.e. <j>(X) = X1 II ··· II ~· 
If QcA and Q is non-empty, then the path structure condition for underestimation given 
Theorem 4.8. is satisfied if and only if the system is a series system of all the components, i.e. 
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5. Applications to network systems. 
In this section we present some applications of our results to network systems. It is easily seen 
that the results given in this section may be extended to cover any type of network system. 
However, in order to limit the presentation we have chosen to investigate dependence models 
for socalled k-terminal undirected network systems. An example of such a system is shown in 
Figure 5.1. (k=3). 
4 
5 
Figure 5.1. A 3-temlinal undirected network system. 
The system functions if and only if the three terminal nodes t1, 12 and t3 can communicate 
through the network. We assume that the nodes of the system are perfect. Hence, the compo-
nents of the system are the edges (denoted by the numbers 1, .... ,8). 
Now, assume that (E,<I>) is a k-terminal undirected network system with perfect nodes, i.e. E = 
{ l, .... ,n} is the set of edges of the network. Furthermore, let V = { v1, ..... ,vm} denote the node 
set of the network, and TcV the set of temlinals. Thus, ITI = (the cardinality ofT) = k, and we 
of course have that 2::;; k::;; m. For each ve V we let E(v) denote the set of edges incident to the 
node v. Finally, we introduce two families of subsets ofE given by: 
(5.1.) :N: = {E(v) : ve V} 
(5.2.) .M = The family of minimal circuit sets of the network. 
We now consider two types of dependence models for (E,<!>), based on respectively the shock 
model and the stand-by model. 
Model 1. Assume that the dependence between the components of (E,<I>) is such that it is 
reasonable to use a shock model. It then remains to select the family A of sets corresponding to 
the external shocks. Intuitively, it seems natural to concentrate on shocks striking edges being 
"close" to each other in the network. Clearly, if ve V, then all the components incident to this 
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node will be close to each other. Motivated by this we let A be a subfamily of}(. Specifically, 
we choose a suitable set ScV such that IE(v)l> 1 for each ve S, and define: 
(5.3.) A = {E(v): veS} 
Without loss of generality we may assume that S = {v1, ..... ,v5 } where s:9n is the number of 
external shocks. Thus, letting Aj=E(vj), j=1, .... ,s, we may write A = {A1, .... ,A5 }. We 
assume that for each set Aje A the corresponding external shock occurs with probability (1-Sj), 
and that for each component ie E the corresponding internal shock occurs with probability 
(1-1t.). Finally, let 8 = (8 1, .••. ,8 ) and 1f = (1t 1, .... ,1t ), and introduce the error function 1 s n 
e(B,'Tf) =The error caused by neglecting the dependence. (See (4.23.)). 
Note that using this model, we may interpret the external shocks as shocks striking the nodes in 
S. If a node is killed by a shock, then the components incident to this node, cannot communi-
cate through this node and are thus eliminated from the system. According to this interpretation, 
the nodes inS may be treated as components having re~iabilities 81, .... ,85 , respectively, while 
the edges may be treated as having reliabilities 1t1, .... ,1tn' respectively. With this extended 
component set all the shocks may be viewed as internal shocks and thus the components (in the 
extended sense of the word) become independent. 
On the other hand, neglecting the dependence caused by the external shocks, is equivalent to 
replacing ej by 1, j=1, ... ,s and 1ti by Pi• i=1, ... ,n, where p 1, .... ,pn are given by: 
(5.4.) p. = 1t. [II e. 1 • i = 1 ..... ,n. 
1 1 J 
j: ie Aj 
Thus, if we use the interpretation of the external shocks as shocks striking the nodes, then 
neglecting dependence may be viewed as a transformation of systems with unreliable nodes into 
systems with perfect nodes. 
Several efficient algorithms for excact reliability computations in the case of independent compo-
nents apply to networks with unreliable nodes. (See f.ex. Satyanarayana (1982) and Wood 
(1985) ). Still, in many cases it may be very useful to perform a transformation as indicated 
above. Especially, when the reliability of a network system is computed using socalled edge 
factoring (See Satyanarayana and Chang (1983)), unreliable nodes can cause problems. This is 
due to the fact that it may be impossible to obtain network representations of the system after a 
factoring in the case of unreliable nodes. 
Obviously, the above transformation will not preserve the reliability of the system. However, as 
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we shall see, by using results from Section 4. in some cases, it may be possible to determine the 
sign of the error. The most important result is provided in the following theorem: 
Theorem 5.1. Consider the k-terminal undirected network system (E,<)>) described above. 
Assume now that SnT = 0 (i.e. the external shocks strike non-terminal nodes only), and that 
IAjl ~ 3, j=1, .... ,s. Then e(8,1'f) ~ 0 for all el' .... ,es' 1t1·····•1tn E [0,1], i.e. the reliability is 
underestimated. 
Proof: We start out by partitioning A into two families A1 and A2 such that A1 contains the 
sets corresponding to system fatal shocks, and A2=A\A1. For each Ae A2 we define FA, G A 
and C A as in Theorem 4.5. 
By combining Theorem 4.1. and Theorem 4.2. as we did in Example 4.3. and using (2.4.) as 
we did in the proof of Theorem 4.5. it follows that e(O, 11') ~ 0 for all el' .... ,es' 1t1, .... ,1tn E 
[0,1], if: 
(5.5.) c(<)>+(E\A)) > 0 , for all Ae A1 , 
and 
Now, let Ae A1, and let v be the corresponding node. Since A is a cut set, v must be a "cut 
node". Thus, since IAI ~ 3, it is easily seen that the network corresponding to (A,<)>+(E\A)) must 
be of one of the three types illustrated in Figure 5.2. (tl' ~and~ denote the terminals of the 
systems.) In all cases it is evident that c( <1> +(E\A)) > 0. (Indeed c( <1> +(E\A))=1 if (A,<)> +(E\A)) is of 
type 1, c(<)>+(E\A))=2 if (A,<)>+(E\A)) is of type 2, and c(<)>+(E\A))=3 if (A,<)>+(E\A)) is of type 3.) 
Hence, (5.5.) is satisfied. 
Similarly, it is easily seen that (A, [ <1> +(G A \A)]+C-(F A \C)) must be of the same three types for all 
CeCA and Ae A2, (whenever C A is non-empty). Hence, c( [<)>+(GA\A)]+C-(FA\C)) > 0 for all 
CeCA and Ae A2, (whenever,C A is non-empty) implying that (5.6.) is satisfied as well. Thus 
we conclude that the theorem is true. D 
We observe that the above theorem does not apply to cases where some of the external shocks 
strike sets corresponding to terminal nodes. This is of course a serious restriction. Especially, 
this implies that if we try to replace unreliable nodes with perfect nodes by performing the 
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network transformation indicated above, then only non-terminal nodes can be treated. However, 
if a terminal, t, in a k-terminal undirected network system (E,<j>) is unreliable, then obviously tis 
in series with the rest of the system. Thus, if 81 is the reliability oft, then: 
( 5. 7.) Pr( <!>= 1) = 8 t Pr( <!>= 1 I t is functioning) 
Hence, the reliability of the system may be computed by first computing the reliability of the 
system considering t as a perfect node, and then multiply this value by et' Thus, unreliable 
terminals are indeed very easy to handle. It is the lVlfeliable non-terminals that cause the 
problems. 




Figure 5.2. The three possibilities for (A,<j> +(E\A)). 
Before we move to the second dependence model, we illustrate the above results by an example. 
Example 5.2. Consider the network system (EuV,<j>) illustrated in Figure 5.3. where 
E={ 1, .... ,6} is the set of edges, V={v,tl'li·~} is the set of nodes and T={tl'li·~} is the set of 
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terminals. We assume that the edges have reliabilities n1, .... ,1t6 respectively while the nodes 
have reliabilities 8,t1,t2;t3 respectively. 
t3 
Figure 5.3. A 3-terminal undirected network with unreliable nodes. 
We now replace 1ti by Pi• i=1, .... ,6 where pl' .... ,p6 are given by: 
(5.8.) pi = { 
1t. ' i = 1,3,6. 
1 
n. e , i = 2,4,5. 
1 
Furthermore, we replace 8,t1,t2 and t 3 by 1. Thus, we have obtained a modified network 
where all the nodes are perfect. Let R denote the reliability of this network. Since IE(v)l = 
1{2,4,5}1 = 3, it follows by Theorem 5.1. and (5.7.) that: 
(5 .9 .) Pr(<J>= 1) ~ t 1 t 2 t 3 R . 
Hence, by performing the above simplifications, we obtain a conservative estimate of the 
reliability of the system. Especially, if n. = n, i=1, ... ,6, by standard calculations it can be seen 
1 
that the error is given by: 
where a, ~ and yare given by: 
(5.11.) a = -4n3 + 9n2 - 6n + 1 
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Figure 5.4. The absoime value of the error as a function of the common 
edge reliability 1t. · 
1 1t 
In Figure 5.4. we have plotted the absolute value of the maximal error w.r.t. 0, 1:1, t 2 and t 3 as 
a function of the edge reliability, 1t. 
If 1t > 0.95 (as is quite usual in highly reliable systems), then the error is less than w-3. Thus, 
the effect of the transformation is indeed quite neglectable. 0 
We now turn to the dependence model based on stand-by components. 
4 t2 
Figure 5.5. A planar network with three regions, r 1, r2 and r3. 
Model2. Assume that the dependence between the components of (E,<j>) is such that a stand-by 
model is reasonable. We are then again faced with the problem of selecting the family Jt of sets 
corresponding to the external stand -by components. As before, it seems natural to concentrate 
on sets of components being "close" to each other in the network. One possibility is of course to 
use the same sets as we did in Model 1. However, in order to obtain a result similar to Theorem 
5.1. it appears to be necessary to let Jt be a subfamily of M, the family of minimal circuit sets 
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of the network. If f. ex. the network is planar and G is a planar embedding of the network, (i.e a 
realization of the network in the plane with no edges crossing) a natural choice would be to let A 
be the family of circuit sets corresponding to the regions of G. An example of such a network is 
shown in Figure 5.5. This network contains three regions, denoted by r1, r2 and r3 respectively. 
The circuit sets corresponding to these are A1={ 1,2,3}, A2={3,4,5,6} and A3={ 6,7,8 }. 
In general we let A={A 1, .... ,A8 } where 1Ajl~2 and, (as we said), Aje M j=1, .... ,s. For each 
set Aje A we assume that the corresponding stand-by functions with probability Jlj. 
Furthermore, for each component ie E the corresponding internal stand-by functions with 
probability Pi· Finally, let Jl= (Jll' ..... ,Jl8) and 11 = (n 1, .... ,1tn), and introduce the error 
function e(J.t,Tf) =The error caused by neglecting the dependence. (See (4.29.)). 
Note that using this model, we may interpret the external stand-by components as components 
affecting the circuits. More specifically, consider a stand-by j and let cj be the corresponding 
circuit. If the stand-by functions, then all the nodes incident to cj can communicate through the 
"area inside" cj. · 
Thus, proceeding like we did when treating Model 1, we get that neglecting dependence may be 
viewed as a transformation of systems with "circuit stand-by components" into standard 
network systems. 
Even if network systems with circuit stand-by components might be rare in real life, the above 
transformation can be useful in order to derive upper bounds on the reliability of a given 
network system. We shall illustrate this by an example later, but first we provide the basic result 
on this model. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 5.1. and thus omitted. 
Theorem 5.3. Consider the k-terminal undirected network system (E,<j>) described above. 
Assume now that the system contains only two terminals (i.e. k=2.), and that IAjl ~ 3, 
j=1, .... ,s. Then e(J,t,Tf) ~ 0 for al1Jll' .... ,Jl 8 , n 1, .... ,1tn e [0,1], i.e. the reliability is 
overestimated. D 
We close this section by providing an example where the above theorem can be used. 
Example 5.4. (Reversed ~-Y-reduction.) Rosenthal and Frisque (1977) introduces a network 
transformation known as the ~-Y -reduction. The effect of this transformation is shown in Figure 
5.6. In many cases this transformation may simplify the reliability calculations. However, this is 
not always true. It is possible to construct examples where the complexity in fact is increased by 
performing ~-Y-reduction. (Especially, the unreliable node produced by the transformation may 
cause problems.) 
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/ Unreliable node. 
Figure 5.6. 11-Y -reduction. 
In some cases it even turns out that a reversed ll.-Y -reduction would simplify the calculations. 
However, in order to construct such a transformation in general, it appears to be necessary to 
introduce a circuit stand-by component. This is done as follows. Assume that we in a network 
system observes a "Y -configuration" consisting of the components a, b, c and v, as illustrated in 
the left-hand part of Figure 5.7. It is desired to replace this by the "fl.-configuration" consisting 
of the components s, t, u and r, shown in the right-hand part of Figure 5.7. 
circuit stand-by component 
Figure 5.7. Reversed ll.-Y-reduction. 
We assume that the components in the original system as well as the transformed system are 
independent, and that the reliabilities are Pa• Pb· Pc• Pv, p8, pt' Pu and Pr respectively. The 
problem now is to determine p8, p1, Pu and Pr such that the reliability of the system is preserved. 
By component factoring, it is easily seen that the solution to this problem is given by: 
(5.12.) Ps = c:Y/(a+O), Pu = y/(y+O) and 
where a, ~. y and 8 are given by: 
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Note that using this formula, it may happen that Pr is negative. This implies that it is not always 
possible to interpret Pr as a probability. However, if we consider the transformation simply as a 
computational tool, this does not matter as long as the final answer is correct. (A similar 
phenomenon occurs when using the ~-Y -reduction, where the unreliable node may have a 
reliability greater than one. For more details, see Rosenthal and Frisque (1977).) 
The problem with this transformation is of course that it produces the circuit stand-by 
component r. If Pr is negative, we may eliminate the problem simply by deleting this 
component. By the monotonicity of the reliability function, this will produce an upper bound on 
the reliability. If on the other hand Pr is positive and the system contains only two terminals, an 
upper bound on the reliability may be obtained by using Theorem 5.3. 
More specifically, we consider the system illustrated in the left-hand part of Figure 5.8. We 
assume that the nodes u and v both have reliability 8, while the terminals, s and t, are perfect. 
All the edges have reliability 1t. Finally, we assume that the components are independent. 
By using Theorem 5.1. we may transform the system into a network with perfect nodes, and 
thus obtain a lower bound on the system reliability by calculating the reliability of the trans-
formed system (f.ex. by using component factoring). This lower bound is given by: 
On the other hand we may perform a reversed ~-Y -reduction on the Y -configuration consisting 
of the edges 2, 4 and 5 and the node v. 1be resulting network is illustrated in the right-hand part 
of Figure 5.8. The circuit stand-by component r may then be eliminated as described above, 
yielding an upper bound on the reliability. (Observe that in this case the reversed~-Y-reduction 
is obviously efficient since it transforms a complex network into a simple series-parallel 
system!) This is given by: 
(5.15.) u1 (8,1t) = 1tll pll { max(O,p0)} Il [8 (1tll pll { max(O,p0)} )] 
where p and p0 are given by: 
2 3 
(5.16.) p = (81t - 81t ) 
2 3 ( 1 - 281t - 81t ) 
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Figure 5.8. Application of the reversed~ -Y -reduction. 
In Table 5.1. 11(8,1t), u1(8,1t) as well as the correct value h(8,1t) are given for 7t=0.5 and 
different values of e. In addition we have tabled some other more well-known bounds on the 
reliability. Specifically, we have: 
k p 
(5.17.) 12(8,1t) = 11 I1 p. u2(9,rc) =II IT p. j=l 1 j=l 1 iEKj iEPj 
(5.18.) 13(8,1t) = max II p. u3(8,7t) =min lJ p. 
l~j~p 1 lsjsk iEK. 1 iEPj J 
where P1, ..... ,P Pare the minimal path sets of the system, K1, ..... ,Kk are the minimal cut sets 
of the system, and the PeS are the component reliabilities (i.e. pi= e if the component i is a 




0.00 0.50000 0.10645 0.50000 0.50000 0.50000 0.50000 0.50000 
0.10 0.50000 0.14443 0 .. 502~)1 0.52492 0.52522 0.52587 0.59500 
0.20 0.50000 0.18742 0. 510ll 0.54972 0.55082 0.55325 0.68000 
0.30 0.50000 0.23535 0.52297 0.57442 0.57670 0.58175 0.75500 
0.40 0.50000 0.28803 0.54124 0.59906 0.60276 0. 6ll03 0.82000 
0.50 0.50000 0.34514 0.56494 0.62369 0.62887 0.64073 0.87500 
0.60 0.50000 0.40617 0.59388 0.64839 0.65490 0.67053 0.87500 
0.70 0.50000 0.47046 0.62767 0.67323 0.68068 0.70009 0.87500 
0.80 0.50000 0. 53712 0.66563 0.69833 0.70602 0.72915 0.87500 
0.90 0.50000 0.60506 0.70680 0. 72384 0.73070 0.75742 0.87500 
1. 00 0.50000 0.67291 0.75000 0.75000 0.75442 0.78466 0.87500 
Table 5.1. Bounds on the reliability for different values of e, (1t=0.5.). 
As is seen from the table, our bounds are superior to the traditional bounds for all values of e. 
However, this will not be true for all types of systems. Since the precision decreases for each 
non-excact transfonnation we perform, our bounds will be outperformed if the number of 
unreliable non-terminal nodes and thr: nl!mb.~r of circuit stand-by components are high. Still the 
main advantage with our bounds is that they cau be computed without knowing the minimal path 
and cut sets. 
6. Conclusions. 
A typical problem when computing the Idiability of a system of dependent components, is the 
lack of information on the joint distribution of the component states. Often the available 
information (if any at all) is more qualitative: than quantitative. That is, one may know something 
about the underlying structure or the sources of the dependence. Still, the information is insuffi-
cient in order to specify a complete distribution. 
In this paper we have focused on situations where, apart from the marginal component 
reliabilities, only the basic structure of the joint distribution is known. A main conclusion is that 
at least in some cases this type of information can be used to detennine the sign of the possible 
error in the reliability if the dependence is neglected. 
By using methods similar to ours it is possible to develop results where the restrictions on the 
system are weaker. However, in order to use these results, more information concerning the 
joint distribution has to be known. 
F.ex. it can be shown that if a BMS, (E,<j>) does not contain cut sets of cardinality one, then 
there exists an E>O (t:::s;l) and a 8(8E)>0 (8(0E)sl) such that the reliability is overestimated if 
SEe [1-E,l] and 8 A E [l-8(8E),l] for all 0cAcE. Using this formulation we obtain a 
considerably weaker cut structure condition than the one given in Theorem 4.4. However, in 
this case the interval for the 8 A-s (AcE) depends on 8E. Thus, it is necessary to know this 
parameter to obtain a conclusion. (If tiE and the marginal component reliabilities are known, a 
conclusion may be obtained by using a similar argument as we did in (4.26.).) 
We have chosen to concentrate on cases where as little as possible is known concerning the joint 
distribution, because we believe that this is perhaps the most common situation. However, the 
presentation is meant to illustrate methods ·whi .~h can be extended to other situations as well. One 
possible application of our results is to r.se rhem in order to identify important parameters of the 
model, estimate these and then obtain a cvnclusiC\11 
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More or less as a biproduct of our study, we have demonstrated that our methods may be used 
in order to obtain bounds on the reliability of network systems. The potential possibilities of 
these methods is not at all covered in this paper. Our intention so far has only been to present the 
basic ideas. We hope to return to this subject in a later paper. 
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